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Abstract 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized United Nations agency responsible for 
regulating maritime transport. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light into the following issues: 
what are the main parameters of influence at the IMO? Who among Member States, industry or other 
players, are the main influencers? And is the process transparent enough? To address this issue, a 
perspective mainly but not exclusively based on the authors’ own experience from the activities of IMO’s 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and specifically its recent focus on how to decarbonize 
shipping is taken. To that effect, the paper examines several issues that may be relevant, including 
delegation size, delegation composition, number of submissions and other factors that may affect 
representation and influence in IMO decision making. The paper also addresses the issue that was recently 
put forward by several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), that the shipping industry deliberately 
promotes strategies and tactics that slow down the drive for decarbonization and that transparency at the 
IMO leaves a lot to be desired. A conjecture of the paper is that better transparency and stricter 
representation rules at the IMO could surely lead to some improvements. In particular it is found that the 
current rules (or lack thereof) may unduly favor some stakeholders. However, even though the drive to 
decarbonize shipping goes at a slow pace, the paper finds no evidence of a coordinated attempt to slow down 
the process. A related conjecture concerns the fragmentation of influence at the IMO, which can perhaps 
explain why things are not moving very fast. 
Keywords: shipping decarbonization; IMO; maritime governance 
1. INTRODUCTION
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized United Nations (UN) agency 
regulating maritime transport. Areas of competence include maritime safety, maritime 
security, marine environmental protection, legal matters, technical cooperation and others.  
The IMO has been recently under attack by various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as 
regards its stance on environmental issues and especially Climate Change, as regards the influence of 
industry in the regulatory process and as regards transparency in that process. Triggered by this, the 
purpose of this paper is to shed some light into the following issue: what are the main parameters 
of influence at the IMO? Who among Member States, industry or other players, are the main 
influencers? And is the process transparent enough? To address these and related issues, a 
perspective mainly but 
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not exclusively based on our own experience within the activities of IMO’s Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) and in particular its recent focus on how to decarbonize shipping is 
taken. To that effect, the paper reviews the position of the NGOs that accuse the IMO as regards 
influence and transparency, describes the IMO regulatory structure, and then analyzes several issues 
that may be relevant, including delegation size, delegation composition, number of submissions and 
other factors that may affect representation and influence in IMO decision making. Some 
recommendations are also offered. 
If one is to examine the above issues in a focused way, perhaps no other topic is more relevant than 
Climate Change and specifically greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships and what the IMO is 
doing to reduce them. In fact, and after many discussions, the first ever mandatory global GHG 
reduction regime for ships was set in July 2011 when a roll call vote at the IMO/MEPC resulted in 
the adoption of mandatory measures. These were the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and the 
Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), which were adopted as an Annex to MARPOL’s 
Annex VI. Note that as is common practice among UN bodies, IMO operates on a consensus 
basis and voting is therefore being avoided as it is perceived to be too divisive. However, with 
respect to EEDI/SEEMP it was impossible to achieve consensus and the measures were adopted by 
vote in spite of fierce resistance by a group of developing countries, including China, India, Brazil and 
Saudi Arabia. 
The issue of GHG emissions was at stake again in all meetings of the MEPC after 2011. But even 
before 2011 the IMO initiated a parallel discussion on Market Based Measures (MBMs) to reduce 
GHG emissions from ships, discussion which was suspended in 2013, and in 2016 the so-called IMO 
Roadmap to reduce GHGs was adopted. The Roadmap stipulated the formulation of an Initial Strategy 
on GHGs by 2018 which with a view to finalizing the strategy by 2023 (for a discussion of this and 
other issues as regards decarbonization see Psaraftis (2018)).  
The GHG agenda was set high as the IMO entered the 72nd session of the MEPC (MEPC 72, 9-13 
April 2018), where some important issues were about to be addressed, including drafting a strategy 
for the reduction of GHGs, the implementation of the 2020 sulphur cap, the Ballast Water 
Management Convention and the recently addressed issue of  marine litter.  In a historical move, 
MEPC 72 adopted the so-called Initial IMO Strategy, which set out a vision to drastically reduce 
GHG emissions from international shipping. An ambitious target was set to reduce CO2 
emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping, by at least 40% by 2030, 
pursuing efforts towards 70% by 2050, compared to 2008; and to reduce the total annual GHG 
emissions by at least 50% by 2050 whilst pursuing efforts towards totally phasing them out (IMO, 
2018a). 
It was actually during the period between MEPC 71 in July 2017 and before MEPC 72 in April 2018, 
and perhaps not by coincidence, that IMO was put under fire for its allegedly weak governance 
structure, which, according to some reports, supposedly allowed the private shipping sector to stall 
action on Climate Change. 
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Figure 1: IMO policymaking influence map – Source: InfluenceMap (2017) 
In October 2017, the British non-profit think tank InfluenceMap published a report entitled ‘Corporate 
capture of the UN IMO: How shipping lobbies to stay out of the Paris Agreement on climate’ 
(InfluenceMap, 2017), which pointed to the industry's unusually large influence in the IMO. They 
presented evidence on how "industry figures are provided with seats at the heart of negotiations" and 
examples of how Member-States being represented by national trade associations and corporate 
official; for the latter they present the case of shipping registries that head the delegation of some 
States with open registries. Figure 1 depicts InfluenceMap’s view on how industry can influence the 
decisions of the IMO. For instance, the report claimed that the Marshall Islands, the flag with the 
world’s third largest fleet in the world, is represented in part by International Registries Inc. (IRI), a 
US-based private shipping company that operates the country’s open registry and that “payments to 
the Marshallese government make up about 10% of the state’s yearly non-aid revenue”. 
Three main industry trade associations which have observer status at the IMO, the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council  (BIMCO) and the World 
Shipping Council (WSC), were directly accused on lobbying to delay GHG emissions reduction 
measures, reject any binding GHG emission targets and that they "collectively opposed ambitious 
energy efficiency standards and appear unsupportive of a price on carbon".  
Although the above report raised some valid points on how industry can influence the IMO negations, 
its scoring methodology was, in our view, simplistic and questionable. For instance, through an analysis 
of websites, social media and even CEO messaging, companies and trading associations were 
scored based on their support of binding GHG emission standards or carbon policies e.g. taxes or 
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trading schemes. Points were taken away if these players opposed raising the ambitions of EEDI or if 
they did not support the Emissions Trading System (ETS) of the European Union (EU). However, that 
an organization expresses caution on GHG targets or on ETS, or on further improvements to the 
EEDI because it feels a certain measure might not be technically feasible or because it might 
compromise safety or create distortions does not necessarily mean that this organization has adopted 
this position in order to delay progress at the IMO. BIMCO and ICS, among others, have replied to 
these allegations (see ShippingWatch 2017a,b). 
Figure 2: Engagement at IMO vs Climate Score – Source: InfluenceMap (2018) 
Ahead of the MEPC 72 meeting in April 2018, where IMO members states and other stakeholders 
were expected to agree on the future environmental strategy, the above NGO released a new report 
which focused on the influence of individual countries and their close ties to shipping companies 
(InfluenceMap, 2018).  The report published the findings of their research that explored how around 
25 key nations pushed to influence the outcome of the IMO talks on climate change. The research 
on engagement at the last four MEPC meetings (based on the number of submissions, speaking time 
during the plenary meetings and the size of delegations) showed that despite their large amount of 
registered tonnage and contribution to IMO's budget, “open registry” states such as Panama and 
Liberia were not particularly active. Based on these metrics the most active countries were found to 
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be Japan, Korea, Denmark, China and Germany. Finally, the report sharply criticized Japan for using 
its economic influence over open registries such as Panama to push against ambitious climate 
policy. Figure 2, taken from InfluenceMap (2018), illustrates two metrics, Climate Score and 
Engagement Intensity on the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. The countries most active on 
climate at the last four MEPC meetings are the ones with high Engagement Intensity scores. The 
Climate Score is based on a scoring methodology that assesses Member States on three climate 
policy areas, such as the support of binding GHG emission targets, the support of ambition for 
energy efficiency standards through EEDI and the support of an ambitious long-term GHG 
reduction pathway. 
To compute the Climate Score, various IMO documents and media reports were gathered, so as to 
analyse the expressed opinion of various Member States on the three above-mentioned policy areas. 
If a country opposed, for instance, quantitative GHG reduction targets (which is the case for China 
and Brazil) on the basis of the principle of Common But Differentiated  Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities (CBDR-RC, of which more in Section 4.2), or had reservations on further improvements 
of the EEDI (the case of Japan, South Korea and Brazil), even on the basis of some valid technical or 
safety concerns, then they received a low score. However, EEDI has indeed been proven in many 
cases problematic, see for instance Psaraftis (2018) and Polakis et al. (2019), so raising concerns about 
it does not necessarily imply that one is against reducing GHG emissions. At the other end of the 
spectrum, countries that supported the Initial IMO Strategy even without stating how GHG emissions 
reductions can be achieved, received high scores. This means that the scoring methodology was 
simplistic and questionable and maybe demonstrated some lack of knowledge of the vast array of 
issues behind GHG emissions reduction. 
A bit after MEPC 72 and in advance of IMO's Council meeting (Council 120th session, 2-5 July 2018) 
Transparency International, an international NGO based in Berlin,  released a full report assessing 
IMO’s governance structure  (Transparency International, 2018b). The report described a number of 
flaws in the IMO’s governance, including a disproportionate influence of private industry and an 
unequal influence of certain Member States in the policymaking process, and highlighted the lack of 
delegate accountability and the fact that the public, and also NGOs, are often unable to find out their 
national delegation’s position in debates and negotiations.  Transparency International had actually 
published earlier (April 2018) a summary of the report raising the following concerns (Transparency 
International, 2018a): 
• Journalists are unable to report freely on IMO meetings and Non-profit organizations with
consultative membership of the IMO can face expulsion if they criticize the agency or report
on country views.
• The majority of the world’s commercial fleet (52 per cent) is registered in (and flies the flags
of) only five states, Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Malta and the Bahamas, many of
which are known as tax havens for ships. Together, these five states contribute 43.5 per cent
of the total funding from the IMO’s 170 Member States. These countries potentially have an
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exaggerated weight in the IMO policymaking processes, particularly if no mechanism against 
undue influence exists. 
• Member-States are able to appoint employees of corporations, including shipping companies,
to their delegations, and they have dominated some delegations. These delegates can actually
determine “their government’s position on IMO policy” and “are not subject to conflict of
interest rules nor to a code of conduct”.
The full report concluded with a large list of recommendations, the main points of which suggest that 
the IMO and the Member-States should (Transparency International, 2018b): 
a. Engage in a process of open dialogue with its external stakeholders on how to improve
transparency
b. Take steps in order to ensure that the decision-making process better reflects the public
interest
c. Ensure that those engaged in decision-making are subject to robust integrity rules and
measures.
We believe that the report of Transparency International presents some valid observations and 
highlights several areas that need attention, for instance on shipping companies being allowed to send 
people to national delegations and also on open access of information and publishing participant lists 
of all meetings, including working groups. At the same time, we also agree with a comment published 
in Lloyds List (2018) to the effect that "reports such as those produced by groups, including 
Transparency International, do not fully understand how the IMO works and are fundamentally driven 
by environmental concerns rather than efficient policy making." 
Triggered by the above reports, as well as by the recent drive to decarbonize shipping, we think that 
further analysis is in order. To that effect, the  rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides some further background on the IMO processes. Section 3 performs our own analysis, 
including looking at delegation size, delegation composition and number of IMO submissions as 
potential indicators of influence at the IMO. Finally, Section 4 looks at the way ahead, and provides 
some recommendations for better IMO governance.  
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2. BACKGROUND ON IMO PROCESSES
2.1 IMO membership and stakeholders 
The IMO is a UN organization established in 1948 and has now as primary purpose to develop and 
maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping which includes, amongst others, safety, 
environmental protection, legal matters, technical co-operation and maritime security. Until 1982 its 
name was IMCO (for Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization) and its headquarters 
are in London, UK. 
The IMO currently has 174 Member States and three Associate Members (Faroe Islands, Hong Kong 
- China and Macao - China). Most UN Member States are also members of IMO, except some
landlocked countries such as Afghanistan, Botswana, Liechtenstein, Rwanda and others. All major 
maritime nations are represented at the IMO. One may notice that Bermuda, the 10th largest ship 
owning country in terms of deadweight according to UNCTAD (2018), is not an IMO Member State. 
Bermuda is however a party to all major IMO Conventions through the United Kingdom (UK) which 
is a Member State, and signatory to such conventions, on behalf of itself and its Overseas Territories; 
Bermuda is actually the largest UK overseas territory by population. 
Various industry interests are also, more explicitly, expressed through NGOs that have the capability 
to make a substantial contribution to the work of IMO as they have been granted consultative status 
by the IMO Council. To date the various interests are well represented, as there are 81 NGOs in 
consultative status, including shipowner associations (e.g. BIMCO, ICS, International Association of Dry 
Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko),  various shipping-related associations such as International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS), Community of European Shipyards’ Associations (CESA), International Association 
of Ports and Harbors (IAPH), Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA),  the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF), but also well-established environmental organizations such as 
Greenpeace International, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Friends of the Earth 
International (FOEI) and even  academic organizations such as the International Maritime Lecturers 
Association (IMLA) or the International Association of Maritime Universities (IAMU) or professional 
associations such as the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology (IMAREST) and the 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), 
In addition, the IMO has entered into agreements of cooperation with other intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) on matters of common interest. To date there are 64 intergovernmental 
organizations which have signed agreements of cooperation with IMO including the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and others. 
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2.2 Structure, Operations and Financing 
The IMO is mainly a technical organization and most of its work is carried out in a number of 
committees and sub-committees. As illustrated in Figure 3, the main committees, which are open for 
participation from all Member States, are the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the Legal Committee (LC), the Technical Cooperation 
Committee (TCC) and the Facilitation Committee (FAL). IMO’s basic fora dealing with maritime safety 
and security are the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) for matters concerning marine environmental protection. There are one or 
two annual meetings of each of these committees and between them, progress on specific matters 
is also achieved through correspondence groups, participation to which is open to all interested 
parties, with Member States and NGOs being particularly active. For specialized matters, 
intersessional meetings (that is, meetings between consecutive committee meetings) may take place. 
On the subject of GHGs, MEPC has held 5 intersessional meetings between MEPC 70 (2016) and 
MEPC 74 (2019).  
Figure 3: IMO’s structure – Source: ClassNK (2019) 
IMO’ highest governing body, the Assembly, consists of all IMO Member States meets once every two 
years and between sessions, the Council, consisting of 40 Member Governments elected by the 
Assembly, acts as IMO’s governing body and supervises the work of the IMO.   
Finally, the IMO is supported by a permanent secretariat of employees who are representative of the 
organization's members. The secretariat is composed of a Secretary-General who is periodically 
elected by the Assembly, and various divisions such as those for marine safety, environmental 
9 
protection and a conference section. Kitack Lim (Republic of Korea) was elected Secretary-General 
of the Organization by the 114th session of the IMO Council in June 2015 for a four-year period 
beginning 1 January 2016 and has recently secured the organization's support for a second term, 
subject to approval by the Assembly in December 2019. The two previous Secretary Generals were 
Mr. Koji Sekimizu (Japan, 2012-2016) and Mr. Efthimios  Mitropoulos (Greece) who served for two 
terms (2004-2011). 
IMO’s activities are mainly funded by assessed contributions on its Member-States and Associate 
Members, however voluntary contributions from Member States, governmental agencies, 
intergovernmental bodies and other public, private and non-governmental sources are also 
accepted. Further income is received through commercial activities (including the sale of 
publications and catering and conference services) and through miscellaneous revenue (including 
interest on financial assets). IMO is very transparent when it comes to its financial statements; the 
ones for 2010 through 2017 are publicly available at the IMO website (see IMO(2019)). 
Regarding the assessed contributions to the IMO budget, these are based on a formula which is 
different from the one used in most other UN agencies: the amount paid by each Member-State 
depends primarily on the size of its registered merchant fleet in total gross tonnage. There has been 
some criticism on IMO’s financing as well, for example that: (a) the formula of the assessed 
contributions is not publicly available , (b) some international organizations and Member States make 
donations to the IMO for specific activities, which could raise questions as to how resistant to influence 
the IMO law-making process is and, (c) the top contributors are Open Registries leading to the view 
that the finance mechanism brings the organization closer to the interests of flag states, and thereby 
the industry (InfuenceMap, 2017).  
Table 1: Rank by Ownership, deadweight of flagged vessels and IMO budget contribution. Source: Authors 
Member State 
/Institution 
Ownership 
Rank1 
Flag of Registration 
Rank2 
Budget 
contribution 
Rank3 
Total Contribution 
(2014-2017) in 
GBP 
Panama 1 1 20,507,975 
Liberia 3 2 12,013,449 
Marshall Islands 2 3 10,011,562 
Sweden 35 4 9,014,515 
United Kingdom 12 18 5 7,925,754 
Singapore 5 6 7,106,327 
Korea 7 20 7 5,363,264 
Bahamas 8 8 5,240,251 
China 3 7 9 5,036,015 
Malta 6 10 4,985,847 
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Japan 2 10 11 4,904,299 
Greece 1 9 12 3,978,104 
European 
Commission 
13 2,085,120 
Norway 9 17 14 1,957,581 
Canada 15 1,075,440 
United States 8 22 16 1,002,355 
Germany 4 17 543,116 
Malaysia 22 18 227,722 
Netherlands 23 19 174,509 
India 16 15 20 109,251 
Data: Ranks for countries of ownership1 and flag of registration2 in terms of deadweight tonnage - Source: UNCTAD 
(2018) 
Contributions to the IMO for 2014 through to 2017 are based on the yearly financial statements – Source: IMO (2019) 
With this additional background in mind, we now proceed to our own analysis , so as to attempt to 
identify parameters or other issues that may be relevant as regards influence or power at the IMO. 
Again, the analysis is based mainly on our own experience, mainly in the context of the MEPC. In that 
sense, whatever results we claim are only conjectures and the treatment is certainly non-encyclopedic. 
3. ANALYSIS
Our analysis has looked at delegation size, delegation composition and number of submissions as 
factors that may be connected to influence at the IMO, with a focus on MSC and MEPC meetings. 
To do so, we have  used IMODocs, which is the IMO  document repository, to identify more than 
10,000 submissions to MEPC and also MSC by 47 IMO Member States and NGOs.  We have added 
MSC submissions to see if there is a difference vs MEPC and since the two committees regularly 
interact on a number of issues. Analysis of delegation size was based on the list of participants for 
each session; for these 47 IMO members we processed an average of more than 1,000 delegates per 
MSC or MEPC session. Details follow. 
3.1 Delegation Size 
Is delegation size a proxy for influence at the IMO? In a strict sense it is not, as a large delegation may 
be, theoretically at least, not very visible in terms of submissions to the IMO or the discussions there. 
By contrast, a small delegation can be very vocal or prolific in terms of submissions, again theoretically. 
However, to the extent the members of a delegation can be used to represent the delegation not 
only at plenary but also at the various working groups that take place simultaneously, then obviously 
a large delegation may have an advantage over a smaller one. In addition, a large delegation may project 
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a sense of superiority in the meeting, if the size of a delegation is perceived by some as related to the 
resources that a delegation has at its disposal (and in many senses it is).  
Each delegation is structured into the following personnel categories, not all of which may appear in 
a specific delegation’s roster: the head of delegation, representatives, alternates, advisers and observers. 
Typically heads of delegations, representatives, and alternates are staff members of the respective 
Member Governments. More on delegation composition in Section 3.3. 
Table 2 lists delegation sizes for the top 20 IMO Member States (in terms of controlled fleet in 
2018) that attended MEPC 72, the landmark MEPC that adopted the Initial IMO Strategy, again in 
2018. We consider representation at MEPC 72 (see IMO(2018b)) as a good proxy of 
representation at MEPC in general, however later in the paper we present aggregate statistics of the 
most recent meetings of MEPC as well as MSC. The table also juxtaposes delegation size vs the 
DWT of the controlled fleet of the Member State and also shows the ratio of delegate size divided 
by fleet DWT. 
Table 2: Delegation size for the top 20 fleets. 
Source: IMO (2018a), UNCTAD (2018) 
Member state Head of delegation, 
representatives, 
alternates 
Advisers, 
observers 
TOTAL=N DWT of 
controlled 
fleet (000 
tons) 
10000N/DWT 
Greece 3 7 10 330176 0.303 
Japan 12 33 45 223615 2.012 
China 3 15 18 183094 0.983 
Germany 4 16 20 107119 1.867 
Singapore 1 10 11 103583 1.062 
Hong Kong 2 1 3 97806 0.307 
Rep. Korea 5 19 24 77277 3.106 
USA 3 15 18 68930 2.611 
Norway 6 11 17 59380 3.031 
Bermuda 0 0 0 54252 0 
Taiwan 0 0 0 50422 0 
UK 3 14 17 49989 3.401 
Mexico 3 4 7 39323 1.780 
Denmark 10 14 24 39212 6.121 
Turkey 3 7 10 27241 2.550 
India 3 0 3 24852 1.207 
Switzerland 2 2 4 24805 1.613 
Belgium 3 2 5 23630 2.116 
Russia 3 10 13 22219 5.851 
Indonesia 21 2 23 20299 11.331 
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One can make a number of observations from the table: 
1. The number of delegates among Member States ranges widely. There seem to be no
guidelines on delegation size, either as a total or in terms of the various sub-categories. This is
totally left to each Member State.
2. There certainly exists no visible correlation between delegation size and fleet size. For instance,
Greece, the Member State with the largest controlled fleet in the world, has a rather small
delegation, in fact same size as Turkey, whose fleet is about 8% the size of Greece in terms
of DWT. Greece has the smallest non-zero ratio of delegation size/fleet size.
3. Japan is by far the most populous delegation (45), Rep. of Korea and Denmark (24 each)
distant seconds, with Indonesia (23) not far behind. USA, Germany, China, Norway are a
cluster of countries that are next (between 17 and 20).
4. Indonesia is top in terms of ratio of delegation/fleet size, with Denmark a distant second.
5. Two countries with significant fleet (Bermuda and Taiwan) sent no delegations. It was noted
before that Bermuda is not a member of the IMO.
6. Some countries which were very vocal at MEPC 72, especially on GHGs,  e.g. Brazil (22
delegates) and Saudi Arabia (12 delegates), are not in the top-20 table.
As an aside we note that a reasonable estimate of the cost of more than 40 delegates traveling from 
Japan to London for a week is 150,000 USD, and if we also count that many of these people also 
attended the intersessional meeting on GHGs the week before and that Japan traditionally hosts a 
welcoming reception right before the MEPC, one can get an idea of the resources that some Member 
States are allocating to IMO meetings. And this is only for MEPC and does not take into account 
resources allocated to preparing submissions to the IMO (of which more in Section 5). 
On the other hand, one could argue that the small size of its IMO delegation has certainly not 
prevented Greece from being No. 1 in terms of world fleet. The question of course is to what extent 
this or other countries are able to influence the IMO decision making process and what are the factors 
that may contribute to such influence. In that respect, fleet size can not, in and of itself, be a proxy 
for such an influence.  Table 3 is the equivalent of Table 2 for some of the major IMO observer 
organizations. These are listed by decreasing order of delegation size. There is no official differentiation 
on personnel categories for each delegation. The table is not exhaustive. 
Again, there seem to be no guidelines on delegation size. It can be seen that the delegations of some 
IMO observer organizations surpass in size that of some of the IMO Member States. It is remarkable 
for instance that the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), an NGO, had 29 delegates under its umbrella 
at MEPC 72 (more on this later). It is also interesting that ship owners are represented via not one, 
but via several distinct organizations. In the above table we can see ICS, CLIA, Intertanko (representing 
tanker owners), Intercargo (representing dry bulk owners), BIMCO, WSC (typically representing 
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container owners), Interferry (representing owners of Ro-Ro ferries), and even the International 
Parcel Tanker Association (IPTA).  Collectively these organizations fielded as many as 47 
representatives at MEPC 72. Of the above associations, ICS and BIMCO are ship type- neutral and 
the others represent sectoral interests, which however appear quite fragmented. 
Table 3: Delegation size, IMO observer organizations, MEPC 72. Source: IMO (2018b) 
OBSERVER ORGANIZATION Number of delegates 
CSC 29 
European Commission 20 
IACS 20 
ICS 18 
CLIA 10 
IMAREST 10 
OCIMF 8 
Intertanko 7 
CESA 7 
BIMCO 5 
WSC 5 
Intercargo 4 
Interferry 2 
OECD 2 
IAPH 2 
IPTA 1 
To shed more light, we turn into an analysis of the composition of each delegation in the section that 
follows. 
3.2 Delegation Composition 
After a cursory investigation, and using again MEPC 72 (IMO, 2018a) as a representative example, the 
following remarks can be made: 
1. There seem to be no rules on who can be admitted to sit on a delegation. The willingness of
the delegation to include someone is about the only prerequisite. One does not even have to
be a citizen of a Member State delegation to be included in its roster. A national delegation
can have a mixture of government officials and industry representatives, with no established
norm on composition.
2. An industry representative has the choice of coming under a number of delegations. Only one
can be used for a specific meeting, but there is a choice. Example: If someone is a staff member
of a shipping company, he can come under any of the shipping industry observer organizations
(see above) or under a specific Member State.
3. If shipowners’ interests could field 47 representatives at MEPC 72 as shown above, the
number itself is misleading, as a shipping company person can alternatively be included in the
roster of a Member State, as an adviser or as an observer. For instance, of the 45 Japanese
delegates, 7 were from the Japanese Shipowners Association. Of the 10 Greek delegates, 4
14 
were from the Union of Greek Shipowners (they could also come under the umbrella of the 
Hellenic Chamber of Shipping- HCS, but that was not the case in MEPC 72). Of the 24 Danish 
delegates, 2 were from Danish Shipping and 4 from A.P. Møller-Mærsk. And so on. In that 
sense, ship owners interests are very well represented at the IMO, even though there is 
certainly a lot of fragmentation. 
4. The same is true on the representation of other members of industry. Of the 21 Brazilian
delegates at MEPC 72, 5 were from mining and logistics giant Vale. Also, a staff member of a
classification society can be included either under IACS (the International Association of
Classification Societies) or under a specific Member State. As an example, at MEPC 72
classification society DNV-GL had  4 delegates with the German delegation, 4 delegates with
the Norwegian delegation, and 2 delegates under IACS (that’s a total of 10 delegates). The
Korean Register of Shipping had 5 delegates with the Republic of Korea delegation, plus 5
under the IACS delegation (again a total of 10 delegates). And so on. We shall see numerous
additional representation possibilities for class societies later in this section. This means that
class is extremely well represented at the IMO, and way beyond its official representation
which is IACS.
5. The European Commission delegation (20 members) included not only European
Commission staff, but also members of the European Parliament (7 members), even though
their roles are distinctly different. The European Commission only has observer status at the
IMO, even though it has long sought for the EU to become a regular member (something that
would deprive EU Member States of the freedom to act independently). As per Section 2, the
European Commission, together with the EU 28 Member States, is entitled to make
submissions to the IMO, on matters that supposedly have “EU content”. For these submissions,
an EU Member State is not allowed to deviate from the position expressed in the submission.
6. The composition of the CSC delegation at MEP 72 is worth noting. It consisted of 29 people,
by far the largest of all observer organizations and second only to Japan as compared to the
top-20 Member States of Table 2. None of these people are CSC staff members, as CSC is
an umbrella organization that hosts several others. In the delegation, one can see people from
NGOs such as Seas at Risk, Transport and Environment, Environmental Defence Fund,
International Council on Clean Transportation, International Windship Association, and from
a variety of other organizations including University College London (UCL) (5 members).
Influence Map, the NGO that raised the issue of corporate capture at the IMO, was also
under the CSC umbrella at that meeting. See also point No. 8 below regarding UCL coming
under the IMAREST umbrella.
7. The affiliations of delegates can be sometimes misleading, or hidden. Take for instance the
case where a shipping company staff member may come as an adviser of the Greek delegation,
but his affiliation as it appears in the IMO delegates list not is the one of his own company,
but that of the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping (HCS), which is the official advisor to the Greek
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government on shipping matters, and who sends him there to represent them. This means 
that the original affiliation of someone who attends IMO meetings may be partially or 
completely hidden. We shall see other examples below. 
8. Οther cases of hidden affiliation are with IMAREST, which is a marine professionals association.
For instance, at MEPC 72 a staff member of UK classification society Lloyds Register (LR) was
listed as environmental manager of IMAREST, with that person’s LR affiliation suppressed. Also
IMAREST regularly lists as members staff of UCL, again without listing their UCL affiliation.
The hidden identity may give LR and UCL an additional outlet to express their interests, which
in reality may not necessarily be identical to those of IMAREST. For UCL this would be a
second outlet in addition to CSC (as per point No. 6 above). For LR, this would be one more
outlet in addition to IACS and the UK which they can also use. And if this were not enough,
we are aware of an MEPC working group on environmental risk evaluation criteria where an
LR staff member was included as a member of the CLIA delegation (that is 4 possible
delegations and counting that can represent a classification society).
9. Who can speak at the IMO? People who take the floor on behalf of Member States are not
limited to the heads of delegations or to official representatives (eg civil servants working in
specific ministries, coast guards, embassies, etc), but may also include advisers who are coming
from a broad variety of organizations, including national research institutes, universities,
national industry or maritime advisory associations, shipping companies, classification societies,
consulting companies, etc. Apparently, the right to take the floor is given to these people by
the respective Member States and what they say has been cleared by these Member States in
accordance with the position of the Member State on the subject of the discussion. This
scheme allows a specific company or group (such as for instance the classification societies
mentioned earlier) to be given the floor not via one but via multiple delegations in the same
meeting.
10. The same is true as regards people who take the floor on behalf of observer organizations.
Even though most observer organizations have specific rules on who may take the floor and
what should be said, others are less strict and we may see situations where what the speaker
may say on the floor may primarily favor their original affiliation (which as mentioned above
may be hidden) vis-à-vis the position of the delegation on behalf of whom they speak. And
even if the latter is the case, the fact that a company or a group can be given the floor not via
one but via multiple delegations may very well distort representation.
11. There seem to be no rules on possible switching among delegations, which seems to be free.
In that sense, a person may come under delegation A in one meeting, and under delegation B
in another meeting, with the listed affiliations being not necessarily the same (if they are not
hidden). This possibility maximizes the benefits of that person’s original affiliation to promote
its interests as they see fit.
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3.3 Number of Submissions 
The number of submissions to the IMO is surely an indicator or influence or power. Simply speaking, 
if you do not submit, only by coincidence someone else will submit something that conforms with 
your interests. A Member State that regularly submits (say) 5 to 10 submissions per MEPC (or MSC) 
meeting, has a higher chance of seeing some of them adopted, than another Member State that sends 
much fewer or no submissions. Of course, submission does not necessarily guarantee adoption, 
however persistent submissions project a sense of leadership and may bear fruit in the long run. A 
Member State that typically does not submit, cannot aspire to have a leadership position, and is 
relegated to the role of commentator of other delegations’ submissions (in the best case), or simply 
to the role of observer (in the worst case). If you want to lead, you have to submit. 
Of course, submission, non-submission, or limited submission is a matter of choice. Nobody forces 
someone to submit, and it may very well be that as a matter of national strategy some delegations 
may have chosen to adopt a “passive” role, that of mainly commenting on others’ submissions or 
staying at the sidelines and watching others debate the issues. Making a non-trivial submission takes 
significant resources, possibly involving R&D or studies to support positions, and if these resources 
are not available or are limited maybe the best strategy is to use them in terms of responding rather 
than proposing. Of course, such a strategy is not necessarily the best way to go after someone’s 
interests. 
Figure 3: MSC and MEPC (left vertical axis, bar chart) and total IMO submissions (right vertical axis, solid line) 
since 2010.  
In the above we present some aggregate IMO submission statistics for MEPC and MSC meetings 
since 2010. As said earlier, we have added MSC submissions to see if there is a difference vs MEPC 
and since the two committees regularly interact on a number of issues. To get a wider perspective, 
we have also added the total number of submissions to the IMO as will be further explained. 
The left vertical axis of Figure 3 shows the MSC and MEPC submissions of various delegations since 
2010. Submissions are shown as a bar chart of the figure (blue: MSC, green: MEPC). The right 
vertical axis of the same figure shows the total number of IMO submissions for the same period 
(not limited to MSC or MEPC). The ranking in the horizontal axis of Figure 3 is by total number of 
MSC and MEPC submissions. Joint submissions are counted for each of the submitters. In the period 
since 2010, there have been a total of 10,146 submissions to the IMO, of which 2,252 have been to 
the MEPC and 1,780 to the MSC (the rest have been submitted to other IMO committees, 
subcommittees, working groups or other bodies). 
In Figure 3 submissions by the EU-28 (submitted via the European Commission) are treated separately 
under label EC and do not count in the submissions of each of the 28 EU Member States. For joint 
submissions, information on who, among the submitters, took the initiative to originate the 
submission was not readily available and is not reflected in the figure. In that sense, the 
figure probably underestimates the leadership position of delegations who originated joint 
submissions, by putting them at an equal footing with their co-submitters. The figure also does not 
show the submissions by the IMO Secretariat, as these do not shed any light on the influence of any 
particular delegation. 
It can be observed from Figure 3 that for the period since 2010, the US, Japan, Germany, IACS and 
Norway have been the top five IMO delegations (in that order) in total number of submissions. The 
order in terms of MSC+MEPC submissions is very similar:  Japan, US, Germany, IACS and Norway. 
Greece, the world’s top fleet, is ranked as low as No. 17 in terms of MSC and MEPC submissions 
and No. 18 in terms of total IMO submissions. There seems to be no substantial difference in 
activity between MSC and MEPC submissions, ie one delegation being very active at MSC but not 
very active at MEPC or vice-versa. Some individual differences do exits, for instance Japan being 
more active in MEPC vs MSC while IACS is more active in MSC vs MEPC. 
Figure 4 shows average delegation size for the last two MSC and the last three MEPC meetings versus 
total number of submissions since 2010, for selected IMO Member States. The total number of 
delegates registered in these 5 sessions was  5,427. The size of the circle for each Member State is 
proportional to that Member State’s controlled fleet in 2018. In Figure 4 Japan (and to a lesser extent 
the US) stand out as outliers, in terms of average delegation size (for Japan), and, to a lesser extent, 
in terms of number of submissions (for both the US and Japan). It should be noted that according to 
UNCTAD (2018), in 2017 China, Korea and Japan accounted for 23.34, 22.51 and 12.94 million GRT 
in newbuildings (respectively). These three countries total to 58.79 million GRT, versus 64.99 million 
GRT for the world shipyards (this is a share of 90.45% of global newbuildings). This, together with 
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fleet size, can perhaps explain the high submission profiles for these countries. It should be noted that 
shipbuilders’ interests are also represented in Europe by CESA and in Asia by ASEF (the Active 
Shipbuilding Experts' Federation). In the above period, CESA had 13 submissions (joint with a number 
of other observer organizations) and ASEF, which was granted consultative status in 2017, only one. 
Figure 4: Average delegation size vs total number of submissions and fleet size for some Member States. The 
areas of the circles are proportional to the controlled fleet size in DWT in 2018. 
The high submission profiles of Norway, Germany, UK and to a lesser extent Denmark can be perhaps 
explained by the significant maritime clusters that are present in these countries. These clusters include 
shipbuilding, marine equipment, class, banking, marine insurance, and other related industries.  In 
contrast Greece, No. 1 in the world in terms of controlled fleet but practically non-existent in terms 
of shipbuilding, perhaps looks like a “sleeping giant” in terms of both delegation size and total number 
of submissions.  
Of course, its few IMO submissions certainly did not prevent Greece’s controlled fleet to attain No. 
1 status in the world. In that sense, it is clear that IMO submissions and delegation size are clearly not 
relevant for a Member State’s controlled fleet size. However, a question that can be asked is, which 
of the major IMO regulatory developments in recent years has had the distinct footprint of Greece? 
We can think of only one, the bulk carrier double hull issue, when due to the intervention of Greece 
in 2004 (see for example IMO(2004)) the IMO reversed its earlier decision to require double hulls 
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for bulk carriers. That was an MSC activity. By contrast, in major recent IMO regulatory activity, 
including the MEPC drive to decarbonize shipping and the Initial IMO Strategy which is likely to 
significantly influence the shape of the industry in the years ahead, Greece has been conspicuously 
low-key, at least thus far. In the words of a prominent member of the Greek shipping industry, “In the 
nineteenth century we were part of the transport system. Now we are just taxi drivers waiting for someone 
to hire our cab.” Figure 5 is a variant of Figure 4 with fleet size removed but with observer organizations 
added. 
Figure 5: Average delegation size vs total number of submissions and fleet size for some Member 
States (blue) and observer organizations (red). 
Among IMO observer organizations, IACS clearly stands out, being No. 4 in terms of overall total 
submissions and even surpassing all Member States except the US, Japan and Germany. Other industry 
associations such ICS, BIMCO and Intertanko follow at a distance. Given that (as per previous sections) 
some IACS members can also participate in an IMO meeting under multiple different delegations 
(including IACS itself) and hence may influence the discussion of what is submitted via these 
delegations as well, the above confirms the significant and perhaps extraordinary profile of class in 
IMO business.  
This is certainly to be correlated with the fact that the maritime mode is the only transportation mode 
that has classification societies. There is nothing even remotely equivalent to class in road, rail or air 
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transportation, and in fact these paradigms mean that one could conceivably think of a world in 
which class does not exist in shipping either. However, the likelihood of this happening is practically 
non-existent. Classification societies have historically developed into entities that have been assigned 
by flag states the task of monitoring regulation compliance, and in fact have developed rules of their 
own for practically any aspect of ship strength, safety, security, training and environmental 
performance. In parallel to their regulatory activity, they also have a commercial arm, in terms of 
selling services of all kinds to shipyards and ship owners. Some class societies have substantial R&D 
departments and have even developed their own ship designs and are actively promoting fuels 
such as LNG and other solutions to decarbonize shipping. It is not within the scope of this paper 
to discuss the history and role of Class in shipping, however our analysis confirms that their influence 
on the industry is significant, and due to the very lax IMO governance rules, perhaps it is way 
more significant than what they should normally be entitled to. Thus, and even though we may 
stop short of claiming that “what is good for DNV-GL is good for Norway” (or for Germany for 
that matter), the fact that IMO rules allow class to be represented via multiple outlets and act in 
unison on selected matters with no checks and balances whatsoever is, in our opinion, a source of 
concern for IMO governance and should be rectified.  
21 
4. THE WAY AHEAD
4.1 IMO Discussion on Reform 
The publication of Transparency International’s report was actually the second time in just six 
months that the IMO was hit by massive criticism, after the one by InfluenceMap. Both reports have 
attracted much attention from the media as various articles were published in Lloyds List, 
ShippingWatch and other outlets. 
In May 2018, Lloyds List (2018) reported that Australia was preparing a proposal to the Council to 
put matters of transparency, representation and the role of industry organizations on the table. This 
move has been supported by a number of countries, and in the 120th Council meeting (July 2018), a 
submission by Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Georgia, Guatemala, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Liberia, Spain, Ukraine, and United Arab Emirates called for the Council to 
be more active in setting, directing and monitoring policy, for Council and Assembly decisions and 
discussions to be made more accessible to Member States and the public; and to examine the role 
of industry bodies attending IMO meetings and whether these bodies accurately reflect the breadth 
of maritime interests; see doc. C 120/4/5. According to the submission the latter was requested "in 
light of the concerns raised by InfluenceMap, Transparency International and other 
commentators". They also proposed amendments to the Guidelines to be considered in order to 
"clarify that reasonable criticism of IMO will not prevent an organization from gaining or maintaining 
consultative status". 
At the 120th Council meeting the establishment of an open-ended working group, to meet at C 121, 
was agreed in order to consider the various reform proposals. In addition, the Council removed 
restrictions so that those wished to release their documents to the public prior to a meeting could 
do so. Interestingly enough, a group of countries that includes the US, UK, Panama, Marshall Islands, 
Japan and then United Arab Emirates has disagreed that the working group should even discuss 
issues of greater access to information and the role of industry bodies;  see IMO(2018c) 
Australia in a submission to the Council's  121th session (IMO(2018d)) has identified a number of 
options to increase public access to discussions and decisions including: providing access to 
documents prior to consideration at meetings; providing public access to live video streaming of 
plenary meetings of the Council and the committees; reform of the media guidelines to allow 
more comprehensive reporting of IMO issues;  and providing free electronic copies of consolidated 
versions of key IMO instruments and administrative documentation. The submission dealt with an 
important issue that has also been highlighted in Transparency International’s criticism, namely the 
fact that press can not name speakers in open plenary without consent and quote their views. 
In Australia's view, delegates represent their national governments and “statements made 
during plenary are statements of confirmed government policy and should therefore be able to 
be quoted without permission”.   
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Although none of the above was decided during the meeting, a number of substantive issues were 
discussed during the 121th Council session and a working group will be re-established at the 
Council’s next session (C122 in July 2019). 
4.2 IMO Governance vs the Initial IMO Strategy 
Is the shipping industry deliberately trying to slow down the IMO in its quest to decarbonize 
shipping, as claimed by InfluenceMap? This is a very serious accusation, and to prove it one will have 
to prove intent, which is very difficult or impossible. We were not able to do so in the context of 
our analysis. However, below we comment on the issue. 
The adoption of the so-called Initial IMO Strategy to reduce GHG emissions in April 2018 (MEPC 
72) was certainly a landmark decision (IMO, 2018a). The big question however is what happens next 
and how fast one can move to implement measures that would make a difference. Indicative of the 
pace at the IMO is the fact that after a fierce debate at MEPC 73 in October 2018, the updated plan 
all the way to MEPC 80 in 2023 replaced the initially suggested word “prioritization” (of the 
candidate measures to reduce GHGs) by the word “consideration”, which surely projects a 
much weaker political will. This choice of wording can explain why no decision was made on any 
measures at MEPC 74 in May 2019. MEPC 74 did exactly what MEPC 73 instructed it to do: it 
just considered the measures that were proposed. When the IMO will move to the next click, 
from consideration to prioritization, or even to decision, is anybody’s guess. 
Was the shipping industry behind the above change in wording? It is hard to say, let alone prove it, 
and in our opinion the wording was chosen so as to bring onboard Member States such as the US 
and Saudi Arabia, who are opposed to the Initial IMO Strategy, not to mention Brazil, India, and 
others who have expressed serious concerns about it. In that sense, using the word “consideration” 
was a compromise solution: in order not to lose concensus, use a wording that gets the least 
common denominator, even though the use of such a wording may compromise what may 
eventually be achieved afterwards, and how fast this can be achieved. 
But the Initial IMO Strategy itself is full of such compromises. For instance, the two stated principles 
that are centrally included in the Strategy (a) non- discrimination/no more favorable treatment and 
(b) Common But Differentiated  Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) are in direct 
conflict with one another. The latter principle was included so as to placate the above group of 
developing countries (mainly Brazil, Saudi Arabia, India, and others) who stood and continue to stand 
firmly behind CBDR-RC.  According to this principle, the formulation of which dates as far back as 
the Kyoto protocol, developing countries claim they have a “differentiated” (read “lower-degree”) 
obligation to reduce GHG emissions, at least vis-à-vis developed countries. It is not the purpose of 
this paper to comment on CBDR-RC (for a discussion versus maritime GHG emissions see Psaraftis 
(2018)). But in our opinion, if there is a single major obstacle for any progress on maritime GHG 
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emissions reduction, it is definitely CBDR-RC, and one will need to find a way to circumvent or 
even eliminate this principle altogether if any serious progress is to be made. So long as CBDR-RC is 
there, and it is clear it is there for political reasons, any talk about industry dragging their feet on 
GHGs misses the point. 
It is of course conceivable that  shipping companies or other industrial interests in Brazil, Saudi 
Arabia, India and others are responsible for these countries’ stance on CBDR-RC and hence GHGs. 
In other words it is conceivable that CBDR-RC, even though it invokes a societal cause enshrined in 
the Kyoto protocol, is used as an argument to “camouflage” whatever other real reasons exist for 
these countries negative stance on GHGs. However, to the extent that something like this is the 
case, it is only speculation. On their part,  industry associations such as ICS, BIMCO and others are 
not advocates of CBDR-RC. But in the specific debate between CBDR-RC advocates (mainly 
developing countries) and opponents (mainly developed countries), these associations are side-lined 
and prefer not to be directly involved. Whether such a continuing debate suits them so that 
discussion on GHG does not move very fast is a hypothesis that cannot be proven.  
Another compromise that was reached just prior to the formulation of the Initial IMO Strategy at 
MEPC 72 was to include both “speed reduction” and “speed optimization” as short term measures 
to reduce GHG emissions. This is so because Chile and Peru objected to the use of the term “speed 
reduction” as a possible emissions reduction measure, on the ground that this may constitute a 
barrier to their exports to Asia (and particularly to those that involve perishable products such as 
agricultural products and others). They suggested the use of “speed optimization” instead. In a 
classical IMO compromise move, both wordings were included in the IMO decision text. However, 
what is meant by “speed optimization” in that text is far from clear and hence is subject to different 
interpretations. 
It turns out that the term “speed reduction” is not well defined either. In many IMO submissions 
and in some other documents such as studies, papers, etc. there is widespread confusion on how 
this term is interpreted. Sometimes it is interpreted in a literal sense, that is, reducing speed 
irrespective of how the reduction is achieved. In that sense, it is often used as a synonym for “slow 
steaming,” which is a voluntary measure. But some other times the term is interpreted as mandating 
speed limits. In fact, a recurrent measure that has been and is being promoted by various NGOs 
is to impose speed limits. Leader of this movement is none other than CSC, who in fact had 
proposed the measure to the IMO in 2010. However, that proposal was rejected at the time. In spite 
of this decision, lobbying for speed limits has continued by CSC and other groups. As a result, speed 
limits were included in the roster of candidate short-term measures of the Initial IMO Strategy. 
More players recently joined the speed limit bandwagon. France submitted a document to the IMO 
supporting the idea. Greece submitted another document advocating mandatory speed adjustments 
or maximum allowed main engine fuel consumptions. Shortly before MEPC 74 (May 2019), a group 
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of more than 100 shipping companies, many of them Greek, issued an open letter advocating speed 
limits. A Tradewinds poll showed 61% support for the measure; see TradeWinds(2019). At both 
MEPC 74  and the intersessional meeting that preceded it, environmental groups protested in front 
of the IMO headquarters asking for ships to slow down to save the planet. A high school student 
gave a passionate speech to that effect. At the same time, industry giant Maersk and other 
stakeholders such as the UK chamber of shipping came out against the measure.  
The speed limit option was discussed at MEPC 74 (May 2019), among other measures. To the 
disappointment of its advocates, the measure was not endorsed, as many stakeholders objected to 
it. Among those, industry associations like ICS and BIMCO are not in favor of the measure. But 
MEPC 74 did not reject it either, so the measure is still alive, at least theoretically.  
Does disagreement on speed limits imply that the shipping industry is deliberately dragging its feet 
on an option that could really make a difference? We have found no evidence for that. Speed limits 
is a very controversial policy option and, if anything, the real reasons that some stakeholders 
advocate it should be explored and brought forward. These include a freight rate increase 
because of the shrinkage of the transport capacity supply curve, which could explain why some 
ship owners support the measure. But as Psaraftis (2019) points out, “the real reasons for 
advocating speed limits are seldom revealed in the public debate, and all promoters typically play 
the “do-gooder” card, that the option is good for the environment, and in particular vis-à-vis the 
Initial IMO Strategy.” In that sense, if it can be understood why some ship owners would support 
this idea, why environmental NGOs would support it is less obvious. For one thing, it is clear that 
such a measure would not apply the “polluter pays” principle, would not internalize the external 
costs of GHG emissions and it would not incentivize the development of low carbon fuels and 
other energy saving technologies that would reduce GHGs. It would treat two ships of vastly 
different energy efficiencies the same, by forcing them to sail at the same speed and thus unfairly 
penalize the energy efficient ship. Yet, NGOs such as CSC and others are firmly advocating the 
measure, and over the years have found the money to finance studies that provide support for it.  
A measure that would definitely incentivize development of alternative fuels and energy saving 
technologies would be a bunker levy or another Market Based Measure (MBM). MBMs were examined 
by the IMO/MEPC in 2010, but after many discussions there was no preference for any of the 11 
MBM proposals and finally the discussion was suspended in 2013. The main reason was the 
objection of the developing countries mentioned above (plus China at the time) on the ground that 
MBMs are allegedly incompatible with CBDR-RC (see Psaraftis (2018) for a discussion). 
At this point in time MBMs are included in the Initial IMO Strategy as a candidate medium-term 
measure (to be finalized and agreed to between 2023 and 2030), as follows: “New/innovative 
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emission   reduction   mechanism(s), possibly   including Market-based Measures (MBMs), to incentivize 
GHG emission reduction.” 
Note the word “possibly”, which means that the fate of MBMs at the IMO is unclear at best. After 
the above ill-fated discussion, interest on MBMs, at least at the IMO, seems currently very slim, and 
this is all across the stakeholder spectrum. France and some Pacific islands proposed that the discussion 
reopen, but this has not yet happened. A comparison between speed limits and MBMs is in Psaraftis 
(2019). 
A player that may have some influence over this process is none other than the EU. The EU has 
agreed to align itself with the IMO process, and essentially refrain from acting on a possible inclusion 
of shipping into the EU ETS before seeing what the IMO intends to do on GHGs. ETS is an MBM, 
and the EU ETS is a major instrument in EU energy policy, covering electricity production and 
several other major industries (but not shipping). The European Commission is closely monitoring 
the IMO process, starting from what is agreed on the initial strategy in 2018 and all the way to 
2023. Thus far it has refused to take the ETS option off the table or even to specify what would 
trigger action on its part. Whether this might put some pressure on the IMO to resume the 
suspended discussion on MBMs and adopt a global MBM before the EU moves on ETS, or do 
something else that provides concrete evidence that GHG emissions will be reduced,  is unclear at 
this time. And even though the Damocles sword of an ETS looks like the default scenario for the 
EU if progress at the IMO is not deemed satisfactory, precisely what action the EU will take and 
when that action will be taken is equally unclear.  
4.3 Conjectures 
Before we can make some recommendations, from the all of above we can make a number of 
conjectures. We use the term conjectures instead of conclusions because these are based on a non-
encyclopedic amount of factual evidence augmented by our own experience and for these reasons 
these results are not necessarily generalizeable. The conjectures are as follows. 
1. For a UN agency tasked with such important responsibilities, and even though the IMO
appears to be functioning reasonably well, IMO governance sometimes is lacking and is subject
to considerable improvement. In particular, rules as regards representation are too lax and
may open the door to situations that do not necessarily promote transparency and a level
playing field.
2. There seems to be no proven evidence that the shipping industry, fragmented as it is, is
deliberately stalling the drive to decarbonize shipping.
3. At the same time, a variety of reasons, mostly political, are responsible for the slow pace of
the regulatory process to decarbonize shipping. There seems to be no evidence of collusion
by IMO stakeholders to that effect.
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4. IMO Member States that seem to be the most potent influencers of IMO policy are Japan,
the US, Germany, Norway and China, with Denmark and Korea not too far behind.
5. The above is matched or sometimes even surpassed by IACS, whose members have the
additional privilege of being allowed to influence IMO policy via multiple additional outlets, in
addition to IACS itself. This constitutes in our opinion, a serious deficiency in IMO governance.
6. Greece, the world’s No. 1 shipping power in terms of controlled fleet, has adopted a low
profile role at the IMO and does not seem to be a main influencer in IMO business.
7. Representation within some delegations and especially NGOs is sometimes hidden and non-
transparent. This is another deficiency in IMO governance.
8. The EU has the potential of influencing IMO developments, mainly as regards the pace of the
decarbonization process, but has not taken full advantage of this potential as of yet.
4.4 Recommendations 
Can something be recommended to improve IMO governance? In Table 4 below we suggest some 
possible reform actions, the majority of which (or perhaps all) are probably too radical to be agreed 
upon. 
Table 4: Suggestions for IMO governance reform 
Suggestion Comment 
Limit the size of each delegation. For instance, five 
people maximum as regular members, plus up to 
five advisers or observers. 
There should be enough people to attend the 
plenary session and working groups running in 
parallel. Japan may find this measure unfair, but 
delegation size can not be uncontrollable. 
For Member States, regular delegates should be 
public servants and staff of the respective Member 
Governments 
This may sound self-evident and is coupled with the 
no-outsourcing requirement (see below). 
For observer organizations, regular delegates should 
be employees of the respective organization. 
This would eliminate the possibility that NGOs field 
a “dogs-and-cats” delegation, of which each member 
promotes its own interest. 
Representation at the IMO cannot be outsourced. We also find this self-evident, as the interests of the 
representer and those of the representee may not 
coincide. Delegations can include advisers and 
observers, but these cannot officially represent them 
(see also next point). 
Advisers and observers cannot take the floor. This is coupled to the no-outsourcing requirement 
and is a measure to avert conflict-of-interest 
situations. 
The real affiliations of delegates should be listed. 
These are the delegates’ employers. There should 
be no hidden affiliations. 
Again, self-evident. 
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If a delegate has dual or multiple employers, only 
one can be used at an IMO meeting, but all 
employers should be listed.  
There should be full transparency on who is who at 
the IMO. 
An organizational entity (shipping company, port, 
consulting company, university, research 
organization, class, shipyard, consulting company, or 
any other private company) cannot send delegates 
to more than one delegations. 
This would avoid interests being represented via 
multiple parallel channels. 
Class can only send delegates to IACS. Class societies will scream in protest to this 
suggestion, however the current very lax scheme 
allows them way too many representation 
possibilities and hence undue influence. 
Switching delegations between different IMO 
sessions is not automatic; it is subject to request by 
the delegate and approval by the IMO secretariat. 
There should be some control on how various hats 
can be switched at the IMO. 
Each delegate should sign a form stating that there 
is no conflict of interest in representation and listing 
also his/her previous employers during the last 5 
years. 
This is self-evident. A question is how this will be 
enforced. There should be penalties for violators. 
The identity of persons who speak at the IMO is 
recorded and is publicly available. All meetings 
including working group meetings are video-taped 
and can be made available. 
Another suggestion in the interest of transparency. 
Of course, knowing that what one says is publicly 
available may change the content of what is said, 
however people and delegations should be held 
accountable to their positions. 
In discussions on the terms of reference of studies 
or procurement contracts, taking the floor under 
any delegation disqualifies one’s employer from 
bidding.  
This is a very serious issue and is suggested so as to 
avoid situations in which people, hidden under 
judiciously chosen delegations, promote the interests 
of their real affiliations by participating in discussions 
on the terms of reference of the very studies for 
which they will later bid.  
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